October 6, 2025
The Honorable Bryan Bedford
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591
RE: Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations
Docket No. FAA-2025-1908
Administrator Bedford:
On behalf of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD), I am pleased to respond to the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding normalizing unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) beyond visual line of sight operations (BVLOS). By way of background, TTD consists of 39 affiliated unions whose members work in all modes of transportation, including aviation workers like airline pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, ramp workers, air traffic controllers, professional aviation specialists, and others.[1] Commercial UAS use beyond the visual line of sight poses new safety challenges for commercial planes and emergency response aircraft. As such, we urge the FAA to take our feedback, and that of our affiliates, into consideration as this rule is finalized. In addition to our own comments, we endorse the comments filed in this docket by our affiliates, the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), and the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU).
BVLOS UAS, if not integrated properly, would pose a direct threat to the National Airspace System (NAS). As written, this proposed rule overtly favors the drone industry by establishing reduced requirements for entry into the NAS for commercial BVLOS drone operators, including lower standards for required key management personnel, aircraft, and pilots, when compared to traditional commercial aviation.
Airspace Limitations
The FAA proposes in §108.180(a) to enable routine BVLOS UAS operations in certain areas within controlled airspace at or below 400 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) when participating in strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring. Per proposed §108.180(c) and (d), airspace authorization would only be required in those portions of Class B, Class C, or Class D airspace, or within the lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an airport, that the FAA specifically designates as requiring authorization. Under this proposal, operators would be able to access the remaining portions of controlled airspace without an airspace authorization.
TTD urges the FAA to limit the airspace scope of commercial BVLOS UAS operations to Class G airspace, below 400 feet AGL until sufficient data exists to support the safe integration of UAS BVLOS operations into controlled airspace. We strongly oppose commercial BVLOS UAS operations in controlled airspace (i.e., Class B, C, D, and E airspace).
Following appropriate safety data and analysis and a subsequent decision from the FAA to authorize operations in Class B, Class C, or Class D airspace, a prudent, safe, and understandable baseline minimum separation standard for UAS operations over, near, or around commercial airports, and Class B, Class C, Class D, and Surface E airspace could be similar to the legal separation standards applicable to manned aircraft when operating in non-visual (i.e., Instrument Flight Rules) conditions in controlled airspace. TTD agrees with APLA’s recommendation of 1000 feet vertical and one mile horizontal as safe minimum separation standards.
Operations Over People
The FAA proposes five categories of risk to people on the ground based on population density. The requirements of each category of operations over people would include the mitigation(s) for that level and all the mitigations of numerically lower levels.
We are concerned that the FAA does not directly address the potential operation of the maximum weight UAS over people in this proposed rule. To be clear, TTD opposes allowing the maximum 1,320 lb. UAS to operate over people. Safety data must be collected and analyzed, and real-world Detect and Avoid (DAA) data needs to be studied to ensure safety is upheld before allowing larger UAS to conduct operations over people in the future. As such, we recommend limiting allowable UA operations to 55lbs or less over people in order to build a safety risk assessment case for allowing larger UA operations in the future.
Operations Near Aircraft Low Altitude Right-of-Way Rules
The FAA explains that proposed changes to the right-of-way structure envisioned under Part 108 would update the existing requirements under Part 91 to accommodate new entrants. Under proposed §108.195 and the proposed amendments to §91.113, UA operating under Part 108 would be required to yield to all manned aircraft broadcasting their position using Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) or electronic conspicuity equipment, and those operating in specific locations. Specifically, manned aircraft operating in a Category 5 population density area as described in proposed §108.185, operating in Class B or C airspace as described in proposed §108.180(b), or departing from or arriving at an airport or heliport would have right-of-way over UA. The FAA has decided not to update §91.113 based on the BVLOS Aviation Rulemaking Committee’s (ARC) proposal related to “detect-and-avoid” at this time. TTD and our affiliates are concerned about the collision hazard associated with these operations. The FAA should not implement any rule or exemption to transfer collision avoidance to manned/crewed aircraft through the application of a DAA standard or allow the aircraft manufacturer or aircraft operator to “self-declare” the capability or compliance to a given Aircraft Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) or DAA standard. This technical capability must be validated by the FAA during aircraft certification processes and procedures before operational approval is granted.
TTD agrees with the FAA on yielding to manned aircraft broadcasting their position using ADS-B and those operating in certain locations. TTD also agrees with ALPA’s recommendation that the FAA maintain strong oversight and that operations be vetted by the FAA, including the technical capabilities of each aircraft, to ensure the safety and reliability of the UAS.
Air Traffic Control and Air Traffic Management
The FAA states that it has preliminarily concluded that the traditional model of Air Traffic Management (ATM) is “not proportional, relative to the low level of risk BVLOS operations” under Part 108 would introduce to the NAS. The FAA does not propose to manage either separation of aircraft or the system-wide efficiency of Part 108 operations through its Air Traffic Control (ATC) and ATM functions. Instead, the proposed rule details requirements for deconfliction services by Automated Data Service Providers (ADSPs), which ultimately will be Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM facilitators). We are concerned about the reliability of coordination with conventional ATC, and how they will work cohesively together.
The NPRM relies heavily on ADSPs, also known as UTM service providers, to manage strategic deconfliction—planning to prevent conflicts before flights—and conformance monitoring— ensuring UA follow approved routes and conditions during operations. According to the NPRM, this places traffic management responsibility largely outside traditional FAA ATM, and it introduces complexity in ensuring real-time coordination. UTM systems operated by third parties must communicate and interoperate with ATM systems within the FAA to protect manned operations. However, the NPRM lacks detailed mechanisms for this integration beyond broad interoperability goals. We are concerned that insufficient real-time data sharing and coordination could lead to delayed or inaccurate awareness of UA movements by ATC, risking conflict or emergency responses without adequate time. Unlike manned flights, which use direct controller-pilot communication for immediate traffic advisories and instructions, UA in BVLOS is managed through a layered system of digital services. Controllers must be able to quickly and efficiently detect and mitigate conflicts involving drones, especially with non-cooperative or unauthorized aircraft. The FAA should establish clear mechanisms through which this will be accomplished.
Additionally, TTD echoes ALPA’s concerns around the apparent lack of clarity regarding the interoperability between different ADSPs and how that will work in the current NAS infrastructure. The NPRM’s current language could allow for multiple ADSPs managing traffic in the same airspace. We are concerned about how ADSPs will be able to work with one another, as well as how they will work with legacy ATC. The NPRM does not clearly outline how multiple ADSPs will be able to communicate with one another, let alone for different types of UAS, if all ADSPs would actually work for a specific UAS operating BVLOS. TTD concurs with ALPA’s recommendation for strong guidelines, as well as strong oversight, to ensure not only the interoperability of multiple ADSPs, but also the validity of new systems that are new in the NAS. We are concerned that if these systems are not properly certified, it would create significant complications with current ATC infrastructure as well as jeopardize the safety of the NAS with communication failures and possible near misses with commercial aircraft.
Training Requirements
We encourage the FAA to strengthen training requirements for UAS operators. We are concerned that the language included in the NPRM is not sufficient to ensure UAS operators are sufficiently trained. For example, TTD strongly recommends that training for operators and flight coordinators include mandatory modules on emergency response integration, including Incident Command System (ICS) protocols and coordination with fire departments.
Additionally, the FAA seeks comment on whether the 5-hour experience requirement is sufficient for UA operations under Part 108. In our view, the 5 hours of initial supervised flight experience is too low. Operational experience (OE) requirements for other commercial operations, including those under Parts 121 and 135, require a minimum of 25 hours of revenue flight with a check pilot. The FAA should consider extending required supervised flight experience to be in line with other commercial operations. The FAA also notes that operating experience would not be required to take place during an actual operation, meaning training flight time would satisfy this requirement. TTD joins ALPA in opposing this provision. Training is meant to mimic revenue flying, but it never fully replicates it. Therefore, the initial OE should be an actual revenue flight to ensure the training received has sufficiently transferred to flying a flight in the NAS.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposes to require operations personnel to have general and aircraft specific aviation knowledge and skills as it relates to their respective roles. The permit and certificate holders would be responsible for appropriately training their personnel. TTD shares ALPA’s concerns with regard to the tracking of overall proficiency and the FAA requirements for oversight and guidance on standardization without a formal training program. The FAA should consider implementing a system to ensure these position roles maintain the minimum standard, similar to line checks in the manned environment. The FAA must also exercise oversight to validate the adherence to the manufacturer’s instructions and the operator’s policies and procedures during the training process.
Operator Certification
The FAA has determined that airman certification should not be required of BVLOS UAS operators because certification is not consistent with the “envisioned UAS and operations subject to this proposed rule.” Traditional pilot responsibilities on the flightdeck are constructed around pilot control, including seeing and avoiding other aircraft, interacting with air traffic control (ATC), and monitoring instruments and displays. However, many of these responsibilities remain with the remote UAS operator, at least in some capacity. The NPRM argues that because UAS do not carry responsible persons that can control and ensure the safety of flight from within the aircraft, an airman certification is not necessary. TTD strongly recommends that remote pilots, especially those covered by this proposed rule, be held to the same safety standards and an equivalent level of pilot training and certification as manned commercial pilots. We urge the FAA to consider developing a remote pilot licensing framework based on the complexity of operations, especially those conducting BVLOS, to ensure the highest level of safety and qualification. In order to ensure one level of safety in the NAS, UAS operators conducting BVLOS operations must receive an equivalent level of certification as traditional operators.
Maintenance Personnel Certification
We encourage the FAA to recognize the safety-sensitive nature of the work performed by UAS maintenance personnel and certificate them based on FAA-developed requirements. Additionally, as required by DOT and FAA regulations, FAA-certificated, safety-sensitive maintenance personnel should be subjected to the relevant drug and alcohol testing regulations.
Placing the onus on the operators to determine qualifications – as the FAA currently proposes to do – could lead to UAS maintained to different maintenance instructions by personnel whose qualifications vary drastically from operator to operator. Furthermore, the proposed rule relies heavily on the technological systems incorporated into the UAS itself for safety-critical tasks and operations. Ensuring these systems function properly is of the utmost importance in preventing loss of life and property. As such, we strongly urge the FAA to develop certification requirements for UAS maintenance personnel and certify these employees accordingly.
Hazardous Materials
Section 108.925 of the proposed rule requires UAS or their containers to possess “sufficient structural integrity” to prevent leakage during a crash. The reliance on manufacturer self-certification, without mandatory third-party testing or FAA oversight, lacks adequate safeguards. We encourage the FAA to replace its currently proposed requirement of “sufficient structural integrity” for hazardous materials transport containers with rigorous crash-testing standards equivalent to or exceeding those in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). These standards should encompass impact, vibration, and thermal resistance. The rule should also clearly prohibit carriage of high-risk hazardous materials (e.g., Class 1 explosives or highly toxic substances per Department of Transportation classifications) via UAS, except under emergency exemptions approved by the FAA and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Operators should also be required to report hazardous material-related UAS incidents to the FAA and local fire departments.
Emergency Operations
In time-critical situations, delays in securing FAA approvals by emergency response organizations could result in loss of life or property. The rule’s recognition of first responder support aligns with existing operational needs, but enhancements are necessary to maximize its impact. TTD encourages the FAA to consider implementing a mechanism to prioritize public safety entities, including fire departments, for expedited deviation requests through a dedicated FAA communication channel or pre-approval process. The rule should also require UAS operators supporting emergencies to complete training in incident command systems, consistent with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards, to ensure integration with emergency response teams and prevent conflicts with manned aircraft.
Conclusion
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule and we look forward to working with the FAA in the future.
Sincerely,
Greg Regan
President
[1] Attached is a complete list of TTD’s affiliate Unions